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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Covenants of Estates in Land in Law
and Equity
Though the history of land covenants reveals many
changes, some principles still remain having a remote origin and ill adapted to present needs. In the course of this
review there will appear impressive proof of the antiquity
of our legal structure.
A covenant may be real or personal; and the distinction between them has often been as difficult to define as
a sandbank in a swiftly-flowing river. A real covenant is
simply a contract of a special nature pertaining to land.1
Usually, it is in writing, signed and sealed by the covenanting parties, but may be created in other ways. "It appears to be an essential quality of a real covenant," says
Justice Frost, "that it relate to the realty, having for its
object something annexed to, or inherent in, or connected
with the land or other real property."2 More fully, "real
covenants," says Platt, "are said to be inherent in the land
and will bind the heir or the assignee though not named.
For, as he is entitled to all the advantages arising from
the grant or demise, it is but reasonable that he should
sustain all such burdens as are annexed to the land." 3
A personal covenant is founded on a contract to which
the parties are privy and are bound, also their legal reA real covenant goes
presentatives, for a fixed period.'
further, binding the administrator or executor of the estate of the covenantor, his heirs and devisees for a longer
period and for an amount fixed by common or- statute
xVann, J., Clark v. Devoe (1891)
2

124 N. Y. 120, 124.

Morse v. Garner (1847, S. C.) 1 Strobh. 514, 520, 47 Am. Dec. 565;
Davis v. Lyman (1826) 6 Conn. 249, 256. In Flanniken v. Neal (1887)
67 Tex. 629, 633, Gaines, J., said, "By this is meant that it is a covenant
which accompanies it conveyance of the land and passes from one
purchaser to another through each successive link in the chain of
title".
30n
Covenants, p. 65.
4
Morse v. Aldrich (1837) 36 Mass. 449, 453. Also cases in note 5.
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law. 5 Beside these differences in the two kinds of covenants,
there are others, still more important. A real covenant
relates only to land or to some interest therein and to
incorporeal hereditaments; and the question is not always
easily answered, whether the subject-matter of a covenant
is of proper character for a real covenant or not. Another
difference separates the two kinds of covenants. Between
the parties to a personal covenant there is a privity of
contract, between parties to a real covenant there is a
privity of estate-a tie not only uniting the convenantors,
but all subsequent parties who are in privity of estate with
them.6
Formerly, a covenant was regarded by both parties,
either as real or personal. T Long ago Justice Wilde remarked that a covenant cannot be considered as a grant
to one and a covenant to the other, for the stipulations are
mutual. And more recently Chief Justice Holmes has remarked, "It is most unusual to see a covenant under which
the rights are held in gross and the burdens go with the
land.""
Nevertheless such a view has been adopted in
several jurisdictions.9 This judicial exploit of splitting
the principle to subserve the larger end of justice will be
5
Rawle on Cov. for Title 541, 4th Ed., Derisley v. Custance (1790)
4 Term 75; Kingdon v. Nottle (1815) 4 Maule & Sel. 53; Metcalf v.
Smith (1867) 40 Mo. 572, 576; Barlow v. Delaney (1880) 86 Mo. 583;
Blair v. Allen (1876) 55 Ind. 409; Watkins v. Holman (1842) 16 Pet.
25, 62.
6
Notes 4, 5; Sterling Hydraulic Co. v. Williams (1872) 66 Ill. 393,
397; Fitch v. Johnson (1882) 104 Ill. 111, 121; Louisville & Nash. R.
Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. (1898) 174 Ill. 448; Hazlett v. Sinclair (1881) 76
Ind. 488; Conduitt v. Ross (1885) 102 Ind. 166; Demarest v. Willard
(1826, N. Y.) 8 Cow. 206; Norman v. Wells (1837, N. Y.) 17 Wend.
136, 149; VanRensselaer v. Read (1863) 26 N. Y. 558.
7

Hurd v. Curtis (1837) 36 Mass. 459, 464.

sLincoln v. Burrage (1901) 177 Mass. 378, 379.
9

Gibson v. Holden (1885) 115 Ill.
199; Pillsbury v. Morris (1893)
54 Minn. 492; Conduitt v. Ross (1885) 102 Ind. 166.
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more fully described elsewhere. 10 The same deed may contain both real and personal covenants.""
Leaving these distinctions between personal and real
covenants, we will continue our inquiry into the latter under six heads. (1) Some general characteristics; (2) their
interpretation; (3) the intention of covenantors; (4) the
privity of estate required; (5) the attachment of the covenant to the land conveyed; (6) the benefit and burden of a
covenant.
(1) In the early days courts did not take kindly to a
real covenant. The fear was sounded by Chancellor Brougham that "incidents of a novel kind might be devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."' 2
The echo of this fear has been heard in American tribunals.
"It would be mischievous," said Judge Gholson in a well
known case, "and inconsistent to allow every species of covenant which wit or caprice might devise, however collateral
to the use of the land demised, to be connected with the estate. Therefore, from the earliest times, the distinction between such covenants as may run with the land and such as
3
are collateral and cannot has been taken and maintained."'
And in more recent years the New Jersey Court of Chancery has repeated the danger of misusing the covenanting
power. 14 Still more recently in New York; affirmative covenants, with some exceptions, have been disapproved beIOSee note 39.

"Hart v. Lyon (1882) 90 N. Y. 663.
"2Keppell v. Bailey (1834) 2 Mylne & Keen 517, 535. "A covenant
to run with the land must have for its subject matter something which
sustains the estate and the enjoyment of it, and is, therefore beneficial
both to lessor and lessee." Masury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio St.
341, 348.
"sMasury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio St. 340, 348; Los Angeles
Ter. & Land Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (1902) 136 Cal. 36, 42; Norcross v. James (1885) 140 Mass. 188.
14Brewer v. Marshall (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. 679. See
also W. Va. Transp. Co. v. Ohio River, etc. Co. (1883) 22 W. Va.

600, 634.
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cause they are too one-sided and lack mutuality of interest.15
On the other hand Chief Justice Beasley has said that
"such covenants do not hinder, but rather facilitate the
transmission of land from hand to hand."18 A judgment
reinforced by Sims in his scholarly summary, that it "would
seem they are of inestimable value in apportioning and
regulating and insuring the proper use of land granted
and retained." T
A distinct advance in formulating covenants is in using
ordinary words more freely to express the minds of covenantors. Slowly the law has departed from the use of technical terms. Any words, in what part of the covenant
soever found, from which the intent of the parties to enter
into an engagement can be established, are sufficient for
that purpose. In many of the states their word technics
in conveyances of land have been changed or abolished
by statute.' 8
It is true that in creating a real covenant relating to
a thing in esse, the use of the word assigns has never
been essential.' 9 Courts have had more difficulty in determining whether "assigns" is an indispensable word in coV15Miller v. Clary (1913) 210 N. Y. 127; Rubel Brothers v. Dumont
Coal & Ice Co. (1920) 111 N. Y. Misc. 658. See Plattsburg Gas Co. v.
Miller (1924) 206 N. Y. Supp. 42.
' 6 National Union Bank v. Segur (1877) 39 N. J. Law 173, 184.
'1 Real Covenants, p. 228.
' 8 Hurd v. Curtis (1837) 36 Mass. 459, 463; Trull v. Eastman (1841
Mass.) 3 Met. 124, 37 Am. Dec. 126; Masury v. Southworth (1859) 9
Ohio St. 340, 348; Kettle River R. v. Eastern R. Co. (1889) 41 Minn.
461; Davis v. Lyman (1826) 6 Conn. 249, 252; Langdon v. Mayor of
N. Y. (1883) 93 N. Y. 129, 150.
9
11
Spencer's Case (1593, K. B.) 5 Coke 16; Cockson v. Cock (1606)
Cro. Jac. 126; Gilmer v. Mobile & Montgomery R. Co. (1882) 79 Ala.
569, 58 Am. Rep. 623; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Reno (1886) 22 Ill.
App. 470, affd. (1887) 123 Ill. 273; Winfield v. Henning (1863) 21 N. J.
Eq. 188; Hartung v. Witte (1881) 59 Wis. 285; Denman v. Prince
(1862, N. Y.) 40 Barb. 213; Johnson v. American Gas Co. (1917) 18
Ohio App. 124; Huston v. Cin. & Zanesville R. Co. (1871) 21 Ohio
St. 225.
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enants relating to things not in esse. Formerly, no recovery could be founded on a covenant by the lessor to
pay the lessee without mentioning his assigns for build.
ings not in esse at the time of the demise which were to be
erected afterward during the term, as the lease did not run
Gradually the courts have been abandonwith the land.2
ing the old rule that "assigns" was a necessary word in
a land running covenant concerning a thing not in esse,
and are regarding more and more "the intention of the
parties, gathered from the entire instrument, as the governing principle, and not the use or meaning of mere technical
words." In truth, the distinction, says Justice Cartwright,
in the use of assigns in covenants relating to things in esse
and not in esse is not found in reason, is artificial and
arbitrary. 1 So Justice Ladd has remarked, "There never
was ground for a rational distinction between the assignee
20Spencer's Case (1583, K. B.) 5 Coke 16; Doughty v. Bowman
(1848) 11 Q. B. 444; Hansen v. Meyer (1876) 81 111. 321; Lynn v. Mt.
Savage Iron Co. (1871) 34 Md. 603; Dawson v. Western Md. R. Co.
(1907) 107 Md. 70; Woodruff v. Trenton Water Power Co. (1856) 10
N. J. Eq. 489, 506; Tallman v. Coffin (1850) 4 N. Y. 134; Thompson
v. Rose (1828, N. Y.) 8 Cow. 266; Newberg Petroleum Co. v. Dickerson (1870, Tenn.) 2 Humph 126; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Smith (1881) 72
Tex. 122; Cook v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. (1864) 36 Wis. 45; Hartung
v. Witte (1884) 59 Wis. 285; Emerson v. Simpson (1862) 43 N. H. 475,
80 Am. Dec. 184; Wiggins v. Pender (1903) 132 N. C. 628.
286, 294; Hansen v. Meyer
21lPurvis v. Shuman (1916) 273 Ill.
v.
St. Louis etc. R. Co. (1871)
Dorsey
321 distinguished;
(1876) 81 Ill.
App. 470, 477;
65; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Reno (1886) 22 Ill.
58 Ill.
Brockmeyer v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago (1905) 118 Ill. App. 49;
Bailey v.Richardson(1885) 66 Cal. 416; Duffy v. New York & Harlem
R. Co. (1859, N. Y.) 2 Hilton 496; Denman v. Prince (1862, N. Y.)
40 Barb. 213; Brown v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (1899) 36 Or. 128,
47 L. R. A. 409, 78 Am. St. 761; Masury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio
St. 341; Railway v. Bosworth (1888) 46 Ohio St. 81, 86; Doty v. Chattanooga Union R. Co. (1899) 103 Tenn. 564, 48 L. R. A. 160; Ecke
v. Fetzer (1886) 65 Wis. 55; Harris v. Goslin (1841, Del.) 3 Harr. 338;
Sharp v. Cheatham (1885) 88 Mo. 498. See Ellensburg Lodge v. Collins
(1912) 68 Wash. 74.
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'
named and not named as to things not in esse

22

Notwithstanding this clear enunciation of the modern
law, Tiffany maintains that the distinction is still observed,
and is supported by some authorities. 2 3 What however
most of them assert is, the intention of the covenanting
parties must be the chief guide, and while assigns is not
a needful word to create a land running covenant, its
omission is significant of the intention of the covenantors
not to create one. The reasoning in Brown v. Southern
Pacific R. Co., 4 clearly shows how the omission of assigns
in a covenanting agreement should be regarded. The
grantor covenanted to build a fence along a railway, and not
hold the company responsible for damage if he did not
build it. There was no mention of assigns in the deed.
Brown was the successor of the grantor, and the Southern Pacific Company succeeded to the grantee, from whom
Brown sought to recover for the loss of some cows killed
by the railroad. The jury decided against him because the
covenant ran with the land and had not been observed by
his grantor or himself. The reviewing court said that the
failure to include the word "assign" in the deed was not
controlling if it could be reasonably inferred from the language of the instrument that the parties intended the covenant should run with the land. But the absence of such
word or other words of like import might be considered
in connection with the context of the deed in arriving at
the intent of the parties in that respect. "Giving to the
deed such construction, we think the parties thereto never
intended that the stipulation to build and maintain the fence
should be regarded as a covenant running with the land, but
that such clause was meant to be a condition personal to the
grantors, and binding upon them only." This reasoning ap22

Sexauer v. Wilson (1907) 136 Iowa 357, 15 Am. & Eng. Ann.
Cases 54, 7 Rul. C. L. 1101; Bald Eagle Valley R. C. v. Nittany Valley
R. Co. (1895) 171 Pa. 284; Bradford Oil Co. v. Blair (1886) 113 Pa.
83, 57 Am. Rep. 442.
2
Tiffany on Real Property, p. 56(f) 2d Ed.; Kerr on Real Property, p.1218.
24(1889) 36 Or. 128, 135, 47 L. R. A. 409 and notes.
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plies to many of the cases of omitted "assign." The omission
is evidence or an indication of an intention not to create
a real covenant, but it is not decisive. An oral agreement
omitting assigns by all the authorities is personal.2 5
While a covenant real cannot be created by parol,28
or by a deed poll,2 7 or informal writing,28 and therefore
cannot run with the land and form a proper foundation
for an action of covenant in a court of law, whenever the
nature of the agreement permits its passing with the land,
had it been sealed, subsequent purchasers who are- substantially and beneficially interested in its performance may
enforce the agreement in equity. The distinction however
between an accepted deed poll and an indenture has faded
29
out in many jurisdictions, and is losing its force in others.
A real covenant may be created by presumption. "If
one of two proprietors for a short period of time, sufficient
to establish a presumption, maintain a fence, for example,
2

-Weld v. Nichols (1836) 34 Mass. 538; Fitch v. Seymour (1845)
50 Mass. 462; Lydick v. Bait. & Ohio R. Co. (1880) 17 W. Va. 427;
Block v. Isham (1867) 28 Ind. 37.
2"Lydick v. Bait. & Ohio R. Co. (1880) 17 W. Va. 427; Rawson
v. Bell (1872) 46 Ga. 19; Nolle v. Paggi (1891) 81 Tex. 201, 1 L. R. A.
33, 13 L. R. A. 50. See Graves v. Deterling (1890) 120 N. Y. 447;
Wilder v. Maine Cent. R. Co. (1876) 65 Me. 332, 20 Am. Rep. 698;
Guilfoos v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (1893) 69 Hun 693; Wilkins v. Irvine
(1877)27 33 Ohio St. 138.
Parish v. Whitney (1855) 69 Mass. 516; Martin v. Drinan (1880)
128 Mass. 515;. Kennedy v. Owen (1883) 136 Mass. 199; Dawson v.
Western Md. R. Co. (1906) 70 Md. 86; Hinsdale v. Humphrey (1843)
15 Conn. 431; Maule v. Weaver (1847) 7 Pa. 329; An unsealed agreement may be sufficient in equity to grant an easement to use a brick
wall as a party wall. Platt v. Eggleston (1870) 20 Ohio 414; Pendleton
v. Fosdick (1879) 8 Am. L. Rec. 149.
28
Murray v. Jayne (1850, N. Y.) 8 Barb. 612; Joy v. Boston Penny
Say. Bank (1874) 115 Mass. 60.
29
Sexauer v. Wilson (1907) 136 Ia. 357; Atlantic Dock Co. v.
Leavitt (1873) 54; Bowers v. Beck (1883) 94 N. Y. 86; Atlanta,
etc. R. Co. v. Mc Kinney (1906) 124 Ga. 929, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 436;
Finley v. Simpson (1850) 22 N. J. Law 311; Burbank v. Pillsbury
(1869) 48 N. H. 475; Poage v. Wabash, etc. R. Co. (1887) 24 Mo.
App. 199.
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for the benefit in whole or in part of the adjoining proprietor, the law will presume a grant or covenant for which he
becomes legally obliged to do so." "Nor do I entertain any
doubt," said Chief Justice Denio, "but that where such a
presumption is established, it fastens itself upon the land
charged with the burden, and in favor of the tenement
benefitted by it."' 0
"The grant of an easement is in nature and substance
a covenant running with the land," says Justice Rodman,
"while an easement is usually created by words of grant,
words of easement may be equivalent to a grant if such be
the clear intention."s' And likewise Justice Gray has said,
"Words sounding in covenant only may operate by way of
grant of an easement whenever it is necessary to give
them that effect in order to carry out the manifest intention
of the parties."3 And when this happens, the covenant
3
Will run with the land and bind all subsequent owners.
A real covenant is not easily distinguished always from
a condition. The same language has been construed as a
Contra.-Dawson v. Western Md. R. Co. (1907) 107 Md. 70, 68
At. 301, 126 Am. St. 237, 248. "By accepting the deed he assumed the
performance of the condition or stipulation, from which the law will
imply a promise on which an action may be maintained." Bigelow,
C. J., Maine v. Cumston (1867) 98 Mass. 317, 320. See Murray v.
Clay (1849) 7 Ark. 39.
30
Adams v. Van Alstyne (1862) 25 N. Y. 235.
a'Norfleet v. Cromwell (1870) 64 N. C. 1, 12; Brewster v. Ketchell
1 Salk. 198; Hills v. Miller (1832, N. Y.) 3 Paige 254; Trustees of
Watertown v. Cowen (1834, N. Y.) 14 Paige 510; Barrow v. Richard
(1840, N. Y.) 8 Paige 351; Beach v. Crain (1849) 2 N. Y. 86; Rubel
Brothels v. Dumont Coal, etc. Co. (1920) 111 N. Y. Misc. 658. See
cases in note 33.
32
Bronson v. Coffin (1871) 108 Mass. 175.
33
Hogan v. Barry (1887) 143 Mass. 538; Ladd v. City of Boston
(1870) 151 Mass. 585; Brown v. O'Brien (1897) 168 Mass. 484; Morton
v. Thompson (1897) 69 Vt. 432; Greene v. Creighton (1861) 7 R. I. 1;
Brewer v. Marshall (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 537; Kettle River R. Co. v.
Eastern R. Co. (1889) 41 Minn. 461, 472; Blain v. Taylor (1864) 19
Abb, Pr. 228; Easter v. Little Miami R. Co. (1862) 14 Ohio St. 48;
Hazlett v. Sinclair (1881) 16 Ind. 448; Pitkin v. Long Island R. Co.
(1847, N. Y.) 2 Barb. Ch. 221, 47 Am. Dec. 320.
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condition in some deeds and as a covenant in others. The
consequence of the distinction however is important, for if
the language be construed as a condition, the land or interest therein to which the covenant relates is forfeited;
if it be construed as a covenant damages only can be recovered for its violation.

Courts therefore construe such

writings to be covenants whenever this can be done with
34
due regard to their form and the intention of the parties.
A real covenant once attached to, or spread over, the
land is like a subtle liquid, possessing the magic virtue of
diffusing itself through the land to which it is attached and
cannot be separated from

5

it.3

But it may be divided into

3
several parts, and each part is benefitted by the diffusion. 1
And if a covenant conveying a servitude is attached to a
lot, of which a portion is not needed for its enjoyment, the
needless portion may be sold by the grantor or his assigns."
To this diffusive virtue of a real covenant, has been recently added another. Suppose one of two covenantors
wishes their covenant to be regarded as personal and the
other real, whose wish shall prevail? Formerly, it was declared that a covenant must be one thing or the other, real

or personal, no wind vane that blew both ways.3

8

Yet in

modern party-wall covenants the courts have held that payment for the wall may be intended personally for the builder, while the liability to pay for it may run with the owner
34

Avery v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (1887) 106 N. Y. 142; Post v. Weil
(1889) 115 N. Y. 361; Graves v. Deterling (1890) 120 N. Y. 447, 455;
First Methodist Church v. Old Colo. etc. Co. (1883) 103 Pa. 608;
Dempwolf v. Greyhill (1906) 213 Pa. 163.
35Markland v. Crump (1834) 18 N. C. 94, 97; Lewis v. Cook (1851)
35 N. C. 193, 197; Register v. Rowell (1856) 48 N. C. 312; Wiggins v.
Pender (1903) 132 N. C. 628, 638; Chandler v. Brown (1879) 59 N. H.
370; Ford v. W¥alsworth (1838, N. Y.) 19 Wend. 334; Dalton v. Taliaferro (1901) 101 I1. App. 592.
Contra.-Masury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio St. 341, 348; Fresno
Canal, etc. Co. v. Rowell (1889) 80 Cal. 114, 113 Am. St. 112.
"6Hills v. Miller (1832, N. Y.) 3 Paige 254; Fields v. Squires (1868)
1 Deady 366, 9 Fed. Cases, No. 4,776; Rawle on Cov. 354.
37Bronson v. Coffin (1875) 118 Mass. 156, 162.
38Curtis v. Hurd (1837) 36 Mass. 459, 464.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of the land-the non-builder or his assignee.8" No harm
however has come from recoining the principle with two
faces, and so adding another variation to a land covenant.
A land running covenant is not objectionable as tending to create a perpetuity in the legal sense of the term, for,
as Justice Smith has said, "There is always a party in esse
40
capable of releasing the promissor from the obligation.

Real covenants are divided into two classes, affirmative
and negative. The courts have never encountered serious
difficulties in sustaining negative covenants, and American
experience 41 in applying the law to affirmative covenants
42
has been less difficult than that of the English tribunals.
New York is perhaps the only state that limits their enforcement to five classes of cases: leases, party-walls, railway crossings, mill-dams, boundary fences. A recent application of the rule in that state may be given. In Miller v.
Clary,4 ' a covenant had been made whereby plaintiff could
take power from a wheel in defendant's power plant when
in operation. The covenant also contained a provision that
the defendant should construct and maintain the shaft
needful to transmit the power. The court refused to enforce the last provision as it was a personal undertaking
of the original grantor and did not run with the land, or
3OLincoln v. Burrage (1901) 177 Mass. 378, 379; Hart v. Lyon
(1882) 90 N. Y. 663; Gibson v. Holden (1885) Il1. 199; Pillsbury v.
Morris (1893) 54 Minn. 492; Conduitt v. Ross (1885) 102 Ind. 166.
40
Burbank v,Pillsbury (1869) 48 N. H. 475, 477.
41The Supreme Court of Massachussetts wandered in the same
direction on a few occasions. Lincoln v. Burrage (1901) 177 Mass.
378, 380; Town of Middlefield v. Church Mills Knitting Co. (1993)
160 Mass. 267, 271; Norcross v. James (1885) 140 Mass. 188. The
court afterward turned into the broader way of sustaining all covenants whether they were burdensome or beneficial, negative or affirmative, that rested on proper grounds. Whittenton Manuf. Co. v. Staples
(1895) 164 Mass. 319, 327.
4
Haywood v. Brunswick Bldg. Society L. R. 82. B. Div. 403;
London etc. R. Co. v. Gomm (1888) L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 562; Austerberry
v. Corporation of Oldham (1885) L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 750; Clegg v.
Hands (1890) L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 503.
43210

N. Y. 127.
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create an equitable liability on the part of the defendants.
"The rule," said the court, "that affirmative covenants accompanying conveyances of land are not enforceable against
subsequent owners is a wise one." Evidently the deeper
conception of the court was the unreasonable burden borne
by the covenantor, who justly should be relieved. For the
benefits which a covenanting party has received, or may receive, a present consideration has been paid, and the equivalence between the parties has been fixed and rendered.
This may not be so with the other party who is to pay or
perform a future consideration. He may have promised
lightly and without adequate thought of the magnitude of
his undertaking for the benefit he received, and justice calls
for relief.
(2) The interpretation of a covenant is kept within the
determination of the court-a purely legal inquiry. This
includes the nature of the subject-matter. May land include something collateral and incidental thereto? Suppose the grantor in the sale of the fee of his land has
covenanted that the grantee shall pay a tax that has been
assessed thereon, will such a covenant run with it? It
would as between landlord and tenant, but not as between
grantor and grantee unless it was a lien on the land, which
is the law in many states. The books are full of cases defining the subject-matter of agreements or covenants, and
seeking to distinguish between things collateral and not
running with ,the land and other things which are appurtenant and may run. One of the most elaborate recent attempts to answer the inquiry is by the Supreme Court of
Illinois. "If a covenant concerns the land and the enjoyment of it, its benefit or obligation passes with the ownership; but to have that effect the covenant must respect the
thing granted or demised and the act to be done or permitted must concern the land or estate conveyed. In order
that a covenant may run With the land its performance or
non-performance must affect the nature, quality or value
of the property demised, independent of collateral circum-
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stances, or must affect the mode of enjoyment."" The
Supreme Court of Georgia has stressed the enhancement
of the value of the covenanted land as the chief distinction."
In a federal court it was declared that the weight of authority required that some direct advantage or disadvantage
inure to the estate independent of collateral circumstances. 46
Whether a covenant does enhance the value of the land
to which it appertains is largely within the determination
of the covenanting parties. That such an inquiry should be
regarded as their own may be illustrated by the case of a
banker who sold his banking house and land on which it
stood to a banking association and agreed for himself,
his heirs and assigns, that he would not engage in that business for ten years. Did this covenant run with the land?
"It is undeniably clear," said Chief Justice Beasley, "that
the parties to this thought that the covenant in question
was one which would appertain to and benefit not merely
the person of the grantee, but the land itself, which was
to become his by a conveyance. While it is plain that a mere
personal covenant cannot, by the agreement of the parties,
have its nature so altered as to make it transmissable with
the land, nevertheless when the question is whether the
given covenant does concern certain premises, the fact that
such parties considered it to have such quality should be
potent in the decision of the inquiry. Since the parties
4"Keogh v. Peck (1925) 316 111. 318, 38 Am. St. 1151.
4"Grant-Jeter Co. v. Am. Real Estate Co. (1924) 159 Ga. 80, 83;
Rosen v. Wolf (1921) 152 Ga. 578, 584; Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. Jackson
(1898) 108 Ga. 634, 638; Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. McKinney (1906) 124
Ga. 929, L. R. A. (N. S.) 436, 10 Am. St. 215; Muscogee Mfg. Co. v.
Eagle & Phenix Mills (1906) 126 Ga. 210, 54, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 7139;
Md. & Pa. R. Co. v. Silver (1909) 110 Md. 510, 516; Whalen v. Balt.
& Ohio R. Co. (1908) 108 Md. 11; Natural Products Co. v. Dolese &
230, 233; Russell Realty Co. v. Hall (1921
Shepard Co. (1823) 309 Ill.
Tex. Civ. App.) 233 S. W. 996; Deason v. Findley (1906) 145 Ala.
407, 408.
' 6 Hinchman v. Con. Arizona Smelting Co. (1912) 198 Fed. 907,
revd. (1914) 212 Fed. 813, one judge dissenting; Mesa Market Co. v.
Crosby (1909) 174 Fed. 96, 102.
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most manifestly have thought that the stipulation in
question gave additional value to the property, why and on
what ground should the court declare that such was not
the case?" 47 Nor is performance on the premises an essential of a land running covenant. If indirectly affecting
its value to the holder it will run as in the case of an agreement not to establish a competing business on neighboring land.

4

Courts, too, may change their opinion concerning the
nature of things in which convenantors are interested.
Thus once the nature of water was regarded as a thing
too vagrant. to form the subject of a covenant running
with the land. In Wheelock v. Thayer49 the covenant related to the drawing of water from a pond and the court
said that "the covenant could not run with the land for no
land was granted." At a later period the same court held
that while the water might not be the subject of property, the right to take it and to have pipes laid in the soil
of another for that purpose is an interest in realty, assignable, descendible and divisible. 50 In the western states,
where an adequate supply of water is often so difficult to
acquire, its use as a right running with the land and possesses a covenanting quality, indeed is quite as valuable as the
land nourished by it. So the courts in California have
held that the right in water which has been diverted into artificial channels has uniformly been classed as real
property. Morover the western view has become the law
everywhere. In other words the intention of water users
who supposed they were acting within the law in making
covenants for the use of water has won the sanction of the
47National Union Bank v. Segur (1877) 39 N. J. Law 173, 181.
48 Norman v. Wells (1837, N. Y.) 17 Wend. 136; National Union
Bank v. Segur (1877) 39 N. J. Law 173; Van Rensselaer v. Smith (1858,
N. Y.) 27 Barb. 104.
69(1834) 36 Mass. 68, 70; Mitchell v. Warner (1825) 5 Conn. 497;
Lyon v. Parker (11858) 45 Me. 474.
50Goodrich v. Burbank (1866) 94 Mass. 459, 461.
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courts."
A covenant is sometimes construed as a grant. Such
construction has been given to a covenant for a right of
way. 2 Thus construing a covenant one should remember
the relation of covenants to the grant in a deed of land in
fee simple.5 The grant contained in the first part of the
deed is a pure contract, to which the ordinary rules pertaining to contracts apply. By this contract the land is granted
or transferred, and a privity of contract between the contractors, purely personal, is formed in respect to the grant.
Then follows the covenants which, if possessing a real
character, are attached to the land, and warrant the title
54
beside setting forth other undertakings.
Of course, a covenant must accord with public policy.
Whether the covenant offend this principle or not has never
been a hard question for courts to answer. Covenants in
restraint of trade are generally condemned, and also those
relating to transportation rates. 55
(3) Next the intention of the covenanting parties. As
we have seen, whether a covenant runs with the land or
not, its nature and purpose, this is the first criterion, and
the answer to the inquiry is for the courts. Formerly, covenants were scrutinized closely to discover, if possible, any
wrongful intent of the parties; with the passing of this
51Hill v. Newman (1855) 5 Cal. 445, 446; Bradley v. Harkness
(1864) 26 Cal. 69; Stanislaus Water Co. v. Backman (1908) 152 Cal.
716; Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. McKinney (1905) 124 Ga. 929.
2
5'
Stetson v. Curtis (1876) 119 Mass. 266, 268. For other cases see
note 33.
53
For a fuller description see 1 Tiffany on Real Property, p. 379.
54"The covenants in a deed constitute no part of the conveyance,
but are separate contracts The title passes independently of them".
Smith, J., Bagley v. Fletcher (1884) 44 Ark. 153, 160.
5
Whitney v. Unibn Railway Co. (1855) 77 Mass. 359, 363; Norcross v. James (1885) 140 Mass. 188, 192; Taylor v. Owen (1830, Ind.)
2 Blackf. 301; Brewer v. Marshall (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 537; Kettle River
R. Co. v. Eastern R. Co. (1881) 41 Minn. 461; Norfleet v. Cromwell
(1870) 64 N. C. 1; Clifton George Co. v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co.
(1923, Tex. Civ. App.) 247 S. W. 912; the leading case is Tardy v.
Creasy (1880) 81 Va. 553, 59 Am. Rep. and notes.
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fear their interpretations have become more liberal, and
many of their earlier interpretations are no longer
followed.5 6
Covenantors, also, have often declared their intention
in specific words, and when it is in harmony with the legal
nature of the covenant declared by the the court, it is
decisive. 57 But if contrary, the declaration is ineffectual.
Moreover the courts in some jurisdictions guard their right
of interpretation with the spirit of an elder day. Thus in
the case of an agreement creating an easement, in which
the parties expressly stipulated that it should run with the
land the court said it should not run and declared it to be
a personal agreement. Admitting that the intention of the
parties was to create an easement and that the agreement
was formally sufficient for this purpose, the court added
an old fashioned phillipic, "that which is essentially a personal contract cannot be made into either an easement or
a covenant running with the land by a stipulation between
the parties to the contract that it shall be an easement or
covenant running with the land. 58s When, however, covenantors declare expressly that they do not intend their
covenant to run with the land, their declaration is effective,
whether the terms of their covenant were within a legal
boundary or not. 59
(4) Not only must the covenant concern land, but
there must be a privity of estate between the covenanting
parties.60 Without tracing its significance in feudal law, it
will best serve our purpose to start with this requirement
56

Masury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio St. 340, 348; Wilmont v.
Mc Grane (1897) 16 N. Y. App. Div. 412; Conduitt v. Ross (1885).
102 Ind. 106, 109.
S7Jackson v. Arepeka Saw Mills (1907)

53 Fia. 578; Louisville.

etc. R. Co. v. Webster (1900) 106 Tenn. 586; Masury v. Southworth
(1859) 9 Ohio St. 340.
ISRubel Brothers v. Diamond Coal, etc. Co. (1920) 111 N. Y. Misc.
658, 665.
59Md. Coal Co. v. Cumberland, etc. R. Co. (1874) 41 Md. 343;
Fresno Canal, etc. Co. v. Rowell (1889) 8D Cal. 114, 13 Am. St. 112.
Cases in notes 55-57.
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between landlords and tenants in their covenanting relations. Between them there was a privity of estate which
can be easily understood. The one had a temporary possession and use of the land; the other was the permanent
owner and also possessor after the termination of the
tenancy.
Privity of estate for a long period was
confined to this class ;61 then it was extended to
the dominant and servient owners of easements, to
lands of adjoining owners of fences, to party-wall
builders, to the owners of dams and water privileges,
to covenantors for railway crossings, and lastly to the
grantors and grantees of land in fee simple."2 But when
the term was applied to the latter class a different meaning
was given to privity. In all the other classes both parties
60
Webb v. Russell (1789) 3 Term 373; Bally v. Wells (1769) 3
Wilson 25; Houston v. Zahm (1904) 44 Or. 610; Gilmer v. Mobile &
Montg. R. Co. (1881) 79 Ala. 569, 574; Deason v. Finley (1906) 145
Ala. 610; Hurxtal v. St. Lawrence Boom Co. (1903) 53 W. Va. 87, 92;
Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel (1857, N. Y.) 24 Barb. 365, 368; Weyman
v. Ringold (1849, N. Y.) 1 Bradf. 40, 56; Kettle River R. Co. v.
Eastern R. Co. (1859) 41 Minn. 461. "Privity of estate is the result
of tenure, it subsists by virtue of the relation between landlord and
tenant." Platt on Leases, p. 351; Weyman v. Ringo!d (1849) 1 Bradf.
40, 53.
61
London County Council v. Allen (1914) 3 K. B. 642. Of course
this privity continued no longer than the tenancy relation. Webb v.
Russell (1789) 3 Term 393. Consequently if the lessee parts with his
estate to a stranger, the lessor consenting, the privity is destroyed
and the lessee's liability ceases. Brett v. Cumberland (1486) Cr. Jac.
521; Fletcher v. M'Farlane (1815) 12 Mass. 45; Odell v. Solomon
(1885) 99 N. Y. 535.
62
Masury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio St. 341, 348; Pearson v.
Richards (1922) 106 Or. 78; Bright v. Bacon & Sons (1909) 131 Ky.
848, 858; Kettle River R. Co. v. Eastern R. Co. (1889) 41 Minn. 461;
Sexauer v. Wilson (1907) 136 Ia. 357, 362; Gibson v. Holden (1885)
115 Ill. 199 56 Am. Rep. 146; Glenn v. Canby (1865) 24 Md. 127;
Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co. (1889) 70 Md. 493; Brewer v. Marshall (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. 679; Library Neighborhood
Assn. v. Goosen (1924) 229 Mich. 89; Maxon v. Lane (1885) 102 Ind.
364, 368; Harmon v. Burrow (1919) 263 Pa. 188; Sandberg v. Rowland
(1908) 51 Wash. 7, 9, 10; Houston v. Zahm (1904) 44 Or. 610; Beardsley v. Knight (1832) 4 Vt. 471.
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had a continuing estate or interest in the land, the privity
was mutual.6 3 When the term was applied to grantors and
6 4
grantees their privity of estate was created by succession.
There was no mutuality, no linking of interest like that
between lessor and lessee and the other classes above mentioned.
Thus a covenant for the payment of a tax by the
tenant on the land leased by him has been sustained on
many occasions, 5 while a covenant to pay such a tax by
a covenantee who is a grantee in fee has been regarded
merely as a collateral undertaking not running with the
land,6 6 unless it was a recognized legal lien.6 7

Surely the

tax is the same thing in both cases save as above mentioned.
The relation between landlord and tenant is closer, and the
privity between them has a deeper, truer meaning than it
has between the grantor and grantee of land in fee. For
the same reason covenants between party-wall builders,
adjoining fence owners and the like are more generally
sustained than covenants between grantors and grantees
63

Thomas v. Connell (1846) 55 Pa. 13; Borland's Appeal (1870) 66
Pa. 470.
64Stacy v. Thrasher (1848) 6 How. 44, 54; Rensselaer v. Hays
(1859) 19 N. Y. 68, 91; Thomas v. Connell (1846) 5 Pa. 13; Borland's
Appeal (1870) 66 Pa. 470; See cases in note 59. "Both the benefit
and the burden of covenants which touch and concern the thing
demised run, both wth the reversion on the one side, and with the
land on the other, from assignee to assignee, in all cases where the
relation of landlord and tenant exists. But covenants made by the
owner of land, where the relation of landlord and tenant does not
exist, have been the subject of many nice and refined arguments."
Weyman v. Ringold (1849) 1 Bradf. 40, 53.
65Baron v. Whiteside (1899) 89 Md. 448; West Va., etc. R. Co. v.
McIntire (1897) 44 W. Va. 210; Rector of Trinity Church v. Higgin
(1872) 48 N. Y. 533; Security System Co. v. S. S. Pierce Co. (1926)
258 Mass. 4; Mason v. Smith (1881) 131 Mass. 510.
6oGraver v. Duncan (1881) 79 Ind. 565.
67Post v. Kearney (1849) 2 N. Y. 394; Trask v. Graham (1891) 47
Minn. 571; Minneapolis, etc. Co. v. Linnell (1923) 155 Minn. 103;
Cunningham v. Buel (Tex. Civ. App. 287 S. W. 683.
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in fee of land.68
In many cases legal tribunals have declared the analogy
between the covenants of lessors and lessees and grantors
and grantees to be quite perfect, in other cases more remote. Thus Justice Green in an elaborate opinion has
said, "The cases all show that there is a great difference
between a covenant in a lease, a question between landlord
and tenant, and a covenant in an absolute conveyance of
land, a question between grantor and grantee, where the
point to be decided is, whether or not the covenant runs
with the land, that is whether it be a covenant real or
merely a covenant personal. '

69

Long before Justice Wilde,

after saying that a privity of estate existed between lessor
and lessee added, "The same privity exists between the
grantor and grantee where a grant is made of any subordinate interest in land, the reversion or residue of the
estate being reserved to the grantor."' '
The distinction between the two kinds of privities has
68

Holdsworth in his History of English Law says, "As a general
rule a covenant binds only the parties to it or their representatives.
The medieval land law recognized certain covenants which had a
wider operation. They were regarded as being in a sense annexed
to an estate in the land so that they could be enforced by anyone
who took that estate in the land. In ths respect they have some
analogy to easements. They differ from easements in that they can
be enforced only by the person who has the same estate as the
original covenantee

.

.

.

At law, therefore covenants do not run

with the land; they run with the estate in the land to which they are
annexed. The concepton of covenants running with the land is a
later conception due to equity; and, because these covenants running
with the land in equity really run with the land, and not merely
with an estate in it, they have many more of the characteristics of
true easements than the covenants which run at law with an estate
in the land." Vol. 3, p. 157. See further, historical opinions, Purvis
v. Shuman (1916) 273 Ill. 286; Wiggins v. Pender (1903) 132 N. C.
628; Dickson v. 'Desire (1856) ?3 Mo. 157; Los Angeles Ter. & Land
Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (1902) 136 Cal. 36.
69W. Va. Transp. Co. v. Ohio River, etc. Co. (1883) 22 W. Va.
600, 632.
7
°Morse v. Aldrich (1837) 36 Mass. 449, 453; Bronson v. Coffin
(1871) 108 Mass. 175, 180.
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sometimes been stated by the courts in a different mannera distinction between those rights which run only with the
estate in the land and those which are said to be attached
to the land itself. Thus "a covenant for title," says Justice
Wolverton,7 1 "may be instanced as belonging to the former
class, so that he who stands in privity with the estate with
reference to which the covenant was made by descent or
purchase from the grantee or covenantee is entitled to the
benefit of the covenant." In other words privity of estate
exists between such parties by succession. "The covenant
pertaining to the other class partakes of the nature of a
grant or reservation which carries with it an interest in
the land itself, or becomes attached to and qualifies the
estate, and it goes with the land irrespective of privity. An
easement appurtenant is of this latter class. It is a part
of the dominant estate, and remains a servitude upon the
servient estate into whosoever hands the former may
come." The different estates of landlord and tenant in
the same land is the most familiar illustration of this kind
of privity.
How is privity of estate maintained by an assignee of
a covenant who has acquired his estate at a judicial sale?
A statute in most, if not all, the states secures to him his
acquisitions. "As the covenant runs with the land, it is
immaterial whether it pass by deed from the grantor or by a
sheriff's sale.

7 2

One may ask, why is this requirement of privity of
esate so strenuously maintained? Because it lies at the
foundation of a recovery against the covenantor. "To
create a covenant which will run with the land it is
necessary that there should be privity of estate between
71Houston v. Zahni (1904) 44 Or. 610, 620.
72 Green, C. J., Carter v. Denman (1852) 23 N. J. Law 260, 271;
Williams v. Bing (1882) 77 Tenn. 455; Flaniken v. Neal (1887) 67
Tex. 629; Ia. Loan & Trust Co. v. Fullen (1905) 114 Mo. App. 133;
Dickson v. Desire (1856) 23 Mo. 151, 159, 166; Security Bank v.
Holmes (1896) 65 Minn. 531; Mygatt v. Coe (1894) 142 N. Y. 78;
Mc Credy v. Brisbane (1818, S. C.) I Nott & McCord 104; Markland
v. Crump (1834) 18 N. C. 94.
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covenantor and covenantee" is constantly repeated by the
bench. A buys a piece of land, which is afterward sold to
B, and by him to C, who, discovering an encumbrance,
seeks relief from A, the original covenantor. Of course A
ought not to be held unless he is liable. Suppose on the
trial C should fail to prove a proper chain of title from A,
then he is surely proceeding against the wrong person. Let
us take an illustration of a different kind, A town conveyed some land that it owned on condition that the
grantee should give a bond to maintain a highway that
ran through it. The purchaser gave the bond, but neglected to maintain the highway. The town sued him in an
action of covenant but failed because the privity of estate
needful to preserve the covenant was severed and lost
the moment the bond was given and accepted. The town
then became the complete owner of the land and its
remedy was on the bond."s
One may again ask, what right then has the grantee of
a fee in land to proceed against the grantor? He can do
so whenever a privity of estate between them was created
by succession. If this never existed, or if once existing
has been destroyed, the right of action by either is also
lost. When two estates or interests are merged by purchase or otherwise the covenant once existing between the
covenantors is ended as effectively as the life of covenants
in a lease after its expiration.
Equity however has come to the relief of many parties
who have a just claim against covenantors, although privity
of estate may be lacking. There are many cases in which
their engagements have been known by the successors and
73Town of Plymouth v. Carver (1854) 33 Mass. 183; Smith v.
Kelly (1868) 56 Me. 64. For other cases of an assignee's failure to
recover because he had no interest in the estate, see Los Angeles
University v. Seward (1901) 107 Fed. 798; Wheeler v. Schad (1871) 7
Nev. 204, 209; Freeman v. Sadler (1911) 114 Md. 574; St. Stephens,
etc. Church v. Church of the Transfiguration (1911) 201 N. Y. 1;
Nunnally v. White (1861, Ky.) 3 Met. 584; Griffin v. Fairbrother
(1833) 10 Me. 91; Withers v. Wabash R. Co. (1906) 122 Mo. App.
282, 293.
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who, in justice, should be required to fulfill them regardless
of the privity of estate requirement. This great principle
of equity is best illustrated by covenants made by the purchasers of lots in the modern scheme of land improvements.
The deeds conveying these lots generally contain covenants
restricting the kind of homes that may be built, their distance from the street and other restrictions, created for the
general good of all the purchasers. It is a very common
occurrence for some purchaser to attempt to get more
than he purchased by violating the restrictions. Equity has
no difficulty in dealing with him whenever he knew of the
restrictions leaving quite out of sight the privity of estate
74
requirement.
While, therefore, the application of this principle in
the administration of justice is clearly enough seen, why
has it been so difficult to keep the legal conceptions of
privity within a more clearly defined channel? The answer
is just as clear, the departures have been made to prevent
privity from acting as "a legal parasite" to defeat the ends
of justice. Again and again the strict enforcement of
covenants would have wrought ill consequences, never intended by covenantors, and the courts have sought to lessen
or evade them. In so doing privity of estate has been
subjected to a great variety of conceptions. "Certainty is
the mother of repose and therefore the law aims at certainty," said the great Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, but
the law recedes on many occasions from the way of certainty to serve the demands of justice, and so the mother
of repose is still ill at ease.
Among other consequences of this requirement,
logically a stranger or outsider cannot make a land running
covenant because the element of privity of estate is lacking. Nevertheless on some occasions such a covenant has
74The three leading cases are Whitney v. Union Railway Co

(1858) 77 Mass. 359; Parker v. Nightingale (1863) 88 Mass. 341; De
Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club (1892) 50 N. J. Eq. 329. See also
Halle v. Newbold (1888) 68 Md. 265; Newbold v. Peabody Heights
Co. (1889) 70 Md. 493.
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been made and legally recognized. The most famous English case is that of the prior who covenanted to furnish
perpetual song to a music-loving lord and his descendants;
and the covenant was sustained. 7 ' The leading case in this
country maintaining the opposite view is Mygatt v. CoeT in
which a final decision was rendered on the fourth appeal.
Why cannot a stranger warrant or guarantee the title to
land; if so, why cannot the supposed owner? Thus rea7
soned Justice Moncure in Dickinson v. Hoomes. 7

"Is it

necessary that some estate should pass from the covenantor
to the covenantee in order that the covenant may run with
the land? I think not. * * * A person may be willing to purchase land notwithstanding a flaw in the title, if he can
fortify it by proper covenants. The owner may not be
sufficiently responsible, but may be able to procure the
assistance of responsible friends or creditors; or others
may have sufficient interest to join him in the covenants."
And this view has been favorably regarded by other tribunals.
(5) Attachment of the covenant to land. A real covenant, unlike a personal one, is annexed to an estate in
land.78 In applying this principle therefore whenever a
75

Pakenham's case, G. B. 42 Edw. 3, pl. 14.
Y.212, 142 N. Y. 78, 147 N. Y. '456, 152 N. Y. 457
Brewer v. Marshall (1868) 19 N. J.Eq. 537, 542, 543; Ia. Loan & Trust
Co. v. Fullen (1905) 114 Mo. App. 633, 638.
77(1852, Va.) 8 Gratt. 353; Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co. (1883)
30 Minn. 179, 183.
78"A covenant of warranty of title runs with the land to which
the vendee looks as security against any defect in the title, and which
is transmitted to each successive purchaser; and the fact that a purchaser with this covenant sells the land to another person without his
covenant of warranty does not restrict the latter's right, so far as
the previous warranty is concerned, to his immediate vendor. Bennett,
J., Thomas v. Bland (1890) 91 Ky. 1, 3. "The covenant attached to a
grant does not pass by the deed from the covenantee to his assignee.
but only by the land conveyed. It passes not by the form of the
conveyance, but merely as an incident to the land; so when the
grantee takes no estate under the grant, no assignment of the land
by him can transfer it to the assignee." Taft, J., Tillotson v. Prichard
(1887) 60 Vt. 94, 100; Wiggins v. Pender (1903) 132 N. C. 628, 638.
76(1891) 124 N.
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covenant of quiet enjoyment and warranty, for example,
has become attached to land, a subsequent grantee even by
deed of quitclaim may claim the benefit of it. Thus A
conveyed to B a deed of quitclaim containing the usual
covenants of quiet enjoyment and warranty, who conveyed
the land to C, B's son, by quitclaim. A's covenant became
annexed to, and passed with, the land from B to C, who
therefore could avail himself of the benefit of it.79 Suppose
A should convey land in fee to B with covenants of warranty and enjoyment and B should make the unwelcome
discovery that he had purchased no land, what then? Suppose he should sue A for a breach of his covenant? Doubtless he would be surprised to learn there was no covenant
for there was no land to which it could be 'attached; no
privity of estate. But he could sue A on his contract, for
a privity of contract existed between them. Suppose B
should sell his land to C giving a similar deed and he
should make the discovery of owning no land? He too
could sue B on his contract and recover if B was able to
respond. But suppose he was not able, could C sue A?
On what ground? There is no privity of contract between
them, nor any privity of estate, because there was no
estate whatever to which the covenant between A and B
could attach. C therefore is without a remedy. To some
readers this may be one of the surprises of the law. If
there be no land to which an attachment is made, the covenant is useless, disappears like a sunken ship, or vanishing
cloud. Such an attachment seems like a strange illogical
union, though easily explained. By the ancient common law
a chose in action was not assignable. The right of action was
7

9Jenks v. Qunn (1893) 137 N. Y. 223; Hunt v. Amidon (1842) 4
Hill 345; Fowler v. Poling (1849, N. Y.) 6 Barb. 165; Beddoe v.
Wadsworth (1839) 21 Wend. 120; Jackson v. Groat (1827) Cow. 285;
Redwine v. Brown (1851) 10 Ga. 3311; Thomas v. Bland (1890) 91
Ky. 1; Hodges v. Saunders (1835) 34 Mass. 470,475; Le Ray de
Chaumont v. Forsythe (1831, Pa.) 2 P. & W. 513; Hopkins v. Cane
(1836 Tenn.) Yerg. 70; Flaniken v. Neal (1887) 67 Tex. 633; Brady
v. Spurcke (1861) 27 Ill. 478. See Beardsley v. Knight (1832) 4 Vt.
47t.
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arrested in the hands of the owner for the time being, who
only could pursue the remedy. At a later period a covenantee in a real covenant for quiet enjoyment and warranty,
if evicted and unable to recover anything from his immediate covenantor, because of his inability to respond, could
pursue his remote covenantor and recover from him whatever damage he might have sustained. And this has been
the long established rule.80
The authority to do this was acquired, not in the
usual way by assignment contained in the agreement: but
by the transfer of the covenant itself to the land of the
covenantee or purchaser. In legal contemplation the covenant was annexed to the land as an incident, became an
element thereof, and after such transfer or incorporation
into the land passed therewith to subsequent purchasers or
covenantors. Owning the covenant thus acquired, as a
part of the land, he could sue to recover for any prior
breach, the same as an immediate party could do, who
still retained his ownership.81 One may ask, why such a
clumsy method of effecting an assignment of a cause of
action was adopted, instead of making an assignment directly, in the usual manner? Perhaps no definite answer can
be given. The desire to lessen litigation is not satisfactory.
This rule has been subjected to important modifications because of its harshness, and in some cases of its
manifestly unjust application. Let us trace these modifica80

"The principle of the common law, which prevented the direct
transfer of any contract or covenant, as well in regard to its beneftis as its burdens, was that a chose in action was not assignable.
To avoid the obvious injustice of this, where covenants entered into
the very essence of transfers of estates in lands, the common law
permitted a practical evasion of (under the name of an exception to)
its rule, in the case of covenants which it construed to be capable of
running with the land; by allowing their transfer, not by direct assignment, but as incident to the land or some estate in it, where
that was sold or assigned." Gould, J., Van Rensselaer v. Smith
(1858, N. Y.) 27 Barb. 104, 146.
"'Dickson v. Desire (1856) 23 Mo. 156, 159. Lydick v. Balt.
& Ohio R. Co. (1880) 17 W. Va. 427, 442.
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tions in the American decisions. In Georgia the Supreme
Court 82 held in Martin v. Gordon that if the covenantor
had no title to the land his covenant could not run with it,
following the decision in Noke v. Awdor 8 in which Coke,
that doughty champion of legal subtleties, won a famous
victory. Then reviewing the later decisions of New York
and Massachusetts the court remarked that "if one may
judge from the face of their decisions (they) seem rather
to make the law yield to the case than the case to the law".
This principle works such manifest injustice that long
ago it was so far modified that if the covenantor was in
possession of the land covenanted, though without the title,
this was sufficient to support his covenant, because possession might ripen into a good title. This bend in the rule
was clearly set forth in Slater v. Rawson." The plaintiff
failed on his first trial because he could not establish possession in his covenantor at the time of making his conveyance, but, succeeding on the second trial, he finally
won his case. s This rule is still applied in many juris-.
dictions. In one of the latest decisions, "The rule, as declared by the great weight of authority, seems to be that
a covenant of warranty by one having neither possession
of, nor title to, the land conveyed does not run with the
land, and that the right to recover on the covenant belongs
only to the grantee to whom it is made. In other words
a warranty by one who is a stranger to the title, and not
in possession of the land conveyed, is a personal coy-

82(1858) 24 Ga. 523.
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Cro. Eliz. 417.

84(1840) 42 Mass. 450, 455.
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enant."86
In some jurisdictions however the principle has been
put into the legal furnace and remoulded. Thus if the
covenantee was in possession at the time of conveying the
land to another his possession has been regarded as relating back to the first grantor who, therefore, could be held
on his covenant by the second grantee. This further bending of the rule was elaborately explained by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Wead v. Larkin. 87 "If," said the court,
"the question of possession is at all important in reference
to the passing of this covenant to an assignee, it is not the
possession of the covenantor that is material, but that of
the covenantee when he makes his conveyance. Then is
the first time that the covenant passes as attached to the
estate. When first made, it is made to the covenantee
directly and in person, and he takes its benefit by virtue
of his contract, and not as an incident to the estate. It can
certainly never be held that if he takes possession and is
evicted by paramount title, he cannot recover because the
land was vacant when the deed was made to him. Even
then, if we consider that he must take possession before
he can pass the covenant to the grantee, as attached to the
land, we are wholly unable to see why it does not pass if
he has taken possession." And the same view 'has been ably
maintained by the Supreme Court of Vermont S-the logical
sT. C. Company v. Whitehouse (1916) 47 Utah 323, 329; Randolph v. Kinney (1825, Va.) 3 Rand. 3394; Donald v. Rothgeb (1911)
112 Va. 749; McInnis v. Lyman (1855) 62 Wis. 191; Wallace v. Pereles (1901) 109 Wis. 316, 53 L. R. A. 644, 83 Am. St. 898; Gilmer v. Mobile & Montg. R. Co. (1885) 79 Ala. 569; Bethell v. Bethell (1876) 54
Ind. 431, 23 Am. Rep. 650; Wilson v. Widersham (1863) 51 Me. 566;
Chambers v. Smith (1856) 23 Mo. 174; Moore v. Merrill (1845) 17
N. H. 75, 81; Mygatt v. Coe (1891) 124 N. Y. 212; Beddoe v. Wadsworth (1839, N. Y.) 21 Wend. 120, 124; Markland v. Crump (1834)
18 N. C. 94, 97; Bell v. Beisiker (1907) 16 N. Dak. 290; Real v. Hollister (1886) 20 Neb. 112.
87(1870) 54 11.
489.
8
" Morton v. Thompson (1897) 69 Vt. 432. See Allen v. Kennedy
(1886) 91 Mo. 324; Fields v. Squires (1868) 1 Deady 366, 9 Fed. Cases
No. 4, 776.
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development of the more general principle, that some covenants concerning the realty are so necessarily connected
with it as to pass therewith of necessity, and operate between other than the original parties to the covenant. Of
this nature is the covenant of warranty in the deed of bargain and sale. "The reason why these covenants run with
the land is that unless they do so, they cannot be effectual;
nor can the party for whose benefit they are created derive
from them the benefit intended."' 9
This rule is so entirely opposed to the intention and
supposition of the covenanting parties that the courts on
many occasions have sought to find ways of evading it
besides those mentioned. Thus in Minnesota if one conveys land, having neither title nor possession, his covenant
is broken at once and may recover in damages occasioned
by loss of title."' The covenant at once ripened into a
chose of action in favor of the covenantee and by the
transfer of the land by successive warranty the cause
of action is passed along through the successive grantees
until such time as an actual eviction by paramount title
takes place. Then the party who suffers damage may
enforce the cause of action that accrued in favor of the
first grantee against the original covenantor. And this
way has been followed in Iowa and Missouri. 91
Lastly, another way of escape is by applying the doctrine of estoppel to the original warrantor in a suit against
him on his warranty. The rule is unquestioned that a
person who assumes to convey an estate by deed is estopped
as against the grantee from asserting anything contrary
to his deed. He will not be permitted to say that
at the time of conveying the land he had no title to it,
or that none passed by the deed. This rule has been applied
89
Phelps,
0

J., Kellog v. Robinson (1834) 6 Vt. 276, 279.
9 KimbaUI v. Bryant (1869) 25 Minn. 496.
9
1Ia. Loan & Trust Co. v. Fullen (1905) 114 Mo. App. 633; Coleman v. Lucksinger (1909) 224 Mo. 1; Schofield v. Ia. Homestead Co.
(1871) 32 Ia. 317, 320; Rockafeller v. Gray (1922) 194 Ia. 1280. See
Allen v. Kennedy (1886) 91 Mo. 324; Dickson v. Desire (1856) 23

Ito. 151, 159.
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in South Dakota to a grantor who sought to deny that he
had any land to which his deed could attach.

2

Said the

court, "Why should he not be estopped from saying that
he did not have, and convey the constructive possession of
the land as he represented he had and for which he had received a valuable consideration; and that, therefore, his
convenant did not pass beyond his immediate grantee and
that he is not liable to the party who has suffered by his
broken covenant?" In many states there are statutes declaring the effect of covenants running with the land, but
if there is no land to which they can be attached the
statutes have no application. They seem to be like the oftrepeated declaration, that a covenant of warranty is a real
covenant that runs with the land, descends to heirs, vests
in assignees, "is inseparably united to the subject conveyed,
and is a security" therefor. The omission, too, of law
writers is worth nothing. While clearly stating that a
grantor in possession of land, however questionable his
possession, nevertheless may effectively attach his covenant to it, they are silent if he has neither possession nor
title of the land he ostensibly conveys.
Probably the rule has worked less harm with the rapid
development of the country, and the early discovery by the
original covenantee of his failure to get his supposed purchase. Doubtless in most cases he makes the unwelcome
discovery soon enough to proceed against the grantor on
93
his grant or contract of sale regardless of his covenants.
(6) The sixth element in a land running covenant is
the benefit and burden accruing to the covenanting parties.
In an economic sense both are gainers, otherwise they
would not thus obligate themselves. Both pay a considera92

Solberg v. Robinson (1914) 34 S. Dak. 55, 66, 16 Cyc. 686; Cornelius v. Kinnard (1914) 157 Ky. 50; See Smith v. Ingram (1903) 132
N. C. 959. In Indiana it is no defense in an action by a remote
grantee on a covenant of warranty that the defendant was not in
possession and did not put his grantee in possession of the land at
the time of the conveyance. Cline v. McClure 65 Ind. 485.
OsSee Martin v. Gordon (1858) 24 Ga. 553; Randolph v. Kenney
(1825, Va.) 3 Rand. 394; Burtner v. Keran (1873, Va.) 24 Gratt. 42.
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tion or incur a burden for the present or future benefit
they do, or expect to, receive. In law, the benefit and the
burden go together; are, in truth, inseparable. Thus if
one covenants that he will repair a canal provided he can
drain into it the water from his land, both the benefit and
the burden are continuous and conterminous."' Still further
illustrating the inseparability of benefits and burdens, a
company having raised its dam and thereby impaired a
bridge and highway maintained by a town, covenanted to
do this for the town. Though receiving the benefit, after
awhile the company sought to escape from bearing the
burden. The court held that the town was the natural
and convenient protector of the obligation and could enforce it although "not strictly the owner of the highway
as quasi-dominant estate." 95 A party-wall is often built
on the land of adjoining owners, who covenant that the
non-builder either in the present shall pay for his share of
the cost, or in the future when using the wall. The burdens
and benefits are thus borne and enjoyed by the parties or
by their successors.9 "
Their passing to assignees has been the subject of much
discussion, but is losing its importance since equity has
interposed its authority to administer justice between contending parties. The doctrine has often been asserted that
no burden ran unless accompanied with a privity of estate
between the burden-bearer and the enforcing party, while
a benefit ran without a privity between them. This distinction grew out ol the feudal law and is opposed to modern
authority. Both alike must be supported in law by privity
of estate.17 As benefits and burdens are alike regarded as
considerations or advantages which both parties receive,
or expect to receive, and which grow out of the same trans94Norfleet v. Cromwell (1870) 64 N. C. 1; Lincoln v. Burrage
(1901) 177 Mass. 378.
95Town of Middlefield v. Church Mills, etc. Co. (1891) 160 Mass.
267.
96
See note 39.
(1864) 56 N. Y. 684, reported in full in 2 N. Y. City Ct. 320, 327.
97See dissenting opinion of Com. Dwight in Brown v. McKee
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action, no good reason exists for distinguishing between
the effect of the attachment of covenantors to the land,
which is the subject of their covenant."" While an assignee
holds an estate he enjoys its benefits and bears its burdens,
and lays down both the estate and its burdens by an assignment, even though the assignment be to a beggar." It is
true there is the best of reasons for courts of equity to
scan the engagements of covenanting parties where they
are questioned, and correct, so far as this can be done, the
wrongs that have followed, or may follow from their mistaken undertakings. The considerations for these are of the
most variable character and often are misapprehended. But
these serve as no foundation for putting either benefittor or
burden-bearer on a superior plane to the other. It is sometimes said that in the small number of cases of covenants
by strangers, which the law has upheld, there was a lack
of consideration and therefore some reason for treating the
parties differently, but even the soundness of this contention may be questioned, for these were not purely voluntary
undertakings. Of course, wherever positive covenants, as
in England and to some extent in New York, cannot be
enforced, the distinction in the enduring quality of beneficial and burdensome covenants in some ways still prevails.
That the benefits and burdens of covenants are inseparable may be easily shown. Each covenantor may be both
benefittor and burden-bearer. Thus a railway company for
the benefit of maintaining its track through the land of
a farmer may become burdened with maintaining a fence
along the land so used by it. Both go together with
the railway, the benefit and the burden. They may indeed
be separated, and not infrequently the same covenantor
98

Tennant v. Tennant (1911) 69 W. Va. 28; Peden v. Rock Island & Pac. R. Co. (1887) 73 Ia. 328, 321; Baltimore City v. Garrett
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tries to retain the benefit and escape from executing the
burden, like the manufacturing company, above mentioned,
which sought to escape from the burden of maintaining
the bridge. The American Digest for the last twenty years
contains many cases in which the owners of lots forming
parts of a general land improvement scheme have sought
to retain the benefit of their covenants and escape from the
burdens imposed by them.
The burden-bearer has often sought to escape through
the loop-hole of a lack of privity of estate between himself
and the benefittor who is enforcing the obligation. If the
burden is deemed by the courts a hard one, equity has
strained the need of privity of estate on many occasions
to the uttermost in order to relieve, if possible, the burdenbearer from the obligation. To this end the feudal principle has been applied that the burden-bearer was relieved
if privity of estate was lacking, though the benefittor was
still entitled to his benefits. 100 Gradually the courts have
been discarding this distinction, for the reason of it in the
feudal law is lost in our system.
In equity the courts go still further to enforce or
relieve burdens if justice requires, even though privity of
estate be lacking between the contracting parties, provided
a contiact relation exists between them.'
In a luminous
opinion in Horn v. Miller, 1°2 often cited, Justice Clark remarks, "Where privity of contract is dispensed with there
must be privity of estate, but justice sometimes even requires that the right to enjoy such contracts should extend
to all who have a beneficial interest in their fulfillment, not
to impose a burden upon an ignorant and innocent third
person, but to enable purchasers of land to avail themselves
of the benefit to which they in justice are entitled." The
character of a covenant of this kind depends on the effect
of the entire agreement of which it is a part; and "where
the benefit and the burden are so inseparably connected
10OCole v. Hughes (1873) 54 N. Y. 444, 448.
101See note 74.
1o2(ig9o) 136 Pa. 640, 654.
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that each is necessary to the existence of the other, both
must go together; the liability to the burden will be a
necessary incident to the right to the benefit."
Another case may be mentioned; the familiar one of
Tull v. Moxhay,0 3 in which privity of estate was lacking,
but the benefits and burdens were inseparably connected
and the parties had adequate knowledge of the covenant.
The owner of houses fronting a square sold the land adjoining with a covenant from the purchaser not to use
it for any other purpose than a square or garden. Lord
Cottenham declared that the question was, not whether the
covenant ran with the land, but whether the purchaser
should be permitted to use it in a manner inconsistent
with his contract of purchase. Cases of this character are
multiplying in which justice requires the enforcement of
the burden against assignees or subsequent purchasers of
a contract who have benefitted by it and who possessed
adequate knowledge of its terms, even though lacking
technical requirements.
103(1848) 2 Phillips 574.
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